A Reflection on Speciesism

Overview

Since the Industrial Revolution, the relationship between humanity and nature has grown increasingly strained—a tension that has, over the centuries, become widely recognized. Yet, reimagining the position of human beings in nature remains an ongoing intellectual project.

Humans must change—but how? The concept of speciesism suggests that there exists an inherent yet often overlooked disparity in how humans treat different species. This disparity carries with it a critique of a certain form of anthropocentric arrogance. Do humans really occupy a unique position in nature, and if so, in what sense? In what ways is human intervention in the lives of other species possible? Where should the boundaries of such intervention lie?

At this event, Horta will elaborate on the discrimination behind the speciesism attitude towards nonhuman beings, and how the criticism on speciesism can be substantiated. Wei’s commentary will focus on the challenge of abolishing speciesism, with a more lenient stance towards human prejudice.

Speakers

A Reflection on “Speciesism”

On August 7, 2025, the 38th Berggruen Seminar, titled “A Reflection on Speciesism,” was held at CITIC Bookstore in Sanlitun. The event featured Professor Oscar Horta from the Department of Philosophy and Anthropology of the University of Santiago de Compostela, as the speaker, with commentary provided by Professor Wei Benqun from the Department of Philosophy at Renmin University of China.

Professor Horta offered an extensive exposition of his argument against speciesism, which he defined as the discrimination against those who do not belong to a certain species. He challenged cognitively based defenses of anthropocentrism and instead proposed that sentience—rather than species or intelligence—should serve as the morally relevant criterion for ethical consideration. In response, Professor Wei argued that Horta employed an evaluative, rather than descriptive, definition of speciesism, and that this approach may create a dilemma within the analytical framework. He also questioned whether sentience could serve as the sole criterion for determining moral status.

Defining Speciesism

The keynote speech began with Horta outlining his approach to defining discrimination against nonhuman animals. He observed that discrimination arises in a comparative context—that is, when one is treated or evaluated less favorably than another. The decisive factor is not whether direct harm is inflicted, but whether the differential treatment lacks adequate justification. Thus, not all inequalities constitute discrimination; however, once it does, discrimination may manifest either behaviorally (treating a given subject worse) or attitudinally (regarding a given subject as inferior). On this basis, Horta advanced a more precise definition of speciesism: “as the unjustified unfavorable treatment or consideration of beings that do not belong or are not classified as belonging to a certain species.” [1]

On Anthropocentrism and Its Justifications

Horta proceeded to examine the concept of anthropocentrism, explaining that it refers to the disadvantaging of nonhuman beings in treatment or evaluation. Proponents of anthropocentrism maintain that such differential treatment can be justified; if this claim were valid, anthropocentrism would not qualify as speciesism, since speciesism necessarily entails unjustified inequality. Some philosophers, such as Cora Diamond and Bernard Williams, have defended anthropocentrism definitionally, arguing that human interests ought to take precedence over all others by virtue of species membership itself. Other defenses, which are non-definitional, contend that humans possess certain attributes that warrant priority over other sentient beings. Horta categorized these purported justifications into four main categories:

• Verifiable capacities or characteristics;
• Verifiable relationships;
• Attributes that cannot be empirically substantiated;
• Combinations of the above.

Horta raised two main objections to these defenses of anthropocentrism. First, they often rely on circular reasoning—appealing to unverifiable definitions or assumptions that presuppose the conclusion, thereby invalidating the argument. Second, they suffer from species overlap—not all humans possess complex cognitive abilities or special relationships, and many humans, at certain life stages, are extremely vulnerable and dependent on others. Such standards fail to draw a clear distinction between species and conflict with the principle that all humans deserve respect, rendering them insufficient to vindicate anthropocentrism.

Horta proposed three principal lines of rebuttal to anthropocentric arguments. First, he emphasized the importance of analyzing combined justifications by reducing them to their individual components. Each component must be evaluated independently for validity. Second, he highlighted the principle of impartiality, noting that prioritizing human interests over all others reflects an inherent bias. To illustrate this, Horta proposed a thought experiment: imagine that, prior to birth, one does not know whether they will be human or nonhuman.In such uncertainty about one’s species identity, a rational and impartial decision-maker would likely reject a world that operates on anthropocentric principles. Third, Horta argued that moral consideration should be guided by relevance to the capacity to experience harm or benefit, which in most cases depends on sentience. Therefore, he suggested the scope of moral concern should encompass not all biologically defined animals, but to all beings with the capacity for sentience.

Furthermore, Horta argued that the basis for disregarding the moral claims of animals can itself be speciesist, even when it is framed not in terms of species membership but in terms of animals’ alleged lack of certain cognitive abilities or relational capacities. Rejecting this conclusion, he contended, would require applying a stricter standard for identifying speciesism than for recognizing analogous forms of discrimination among humans.We would all agree that it is sexist to defend that women should not have equal rights on the basis of an appeal not to gender or sex but to other features. He further claimed that the magnitude of the suffering undergone by animals—whether through human exploitation or natural causes in cases where it would be possible to help them—vastly exceeds the benefits humans derive from harming or disregarding them. Indifference to such suffering, or the willingness to tolerate it when the victims are nonhuman, is itself symptomatic of speciesism.

Conceptual Boundaries of Speciesism and the Human Prejudice

In his response, Wei Benqun offered a critical analysis of Horta’s account of speciesism. He began by pointing to a widely assumed moral distinction in everyday human practice: actions such as killing for food, long-term confinement, and painful experimentation are deemed acceptable when inflicted on nonhuman animals, yet are regarded as morally impermissible when directed toward humans. The term “speciesism” was first introduced by Richard Ryder, who, by denying the moral relevance of species membership, placed this distinction alongside racism and sexism. Horta accepts this analogy.

Wei identified two difficulties with this evaluative definition. On the one hand, it excludes positions advanced by philosophers such as Bernard Williams and Cora Diamond, who hold that human species membership itself may constitute a morally relevant ground for differential treatment. Even if these views ultimately prove untenable, Wei argued, they should not be dismissed by definitional fiat. On the other hand, if Williams and Diamond are correct, then—by Horta’s definition—differential treatment based solely on species membership would not count as speciesism, a result that runs counter to the very core of the concept. This, Wei suggested, raises two questions: How should the positions of Williams and Diamond be evaluated? And should a descriptive definition of speciesism be adopted so as to preserve conceptual space for debating its moral justification?

Wei also challenged Horta’s emphasis on sentience, particularly the capacity to experience pain, as the sole morally relevant criterion. He asked whether, even when human and nonhuman suffering are comparable in nature and intensity, moral distinctions may still arise. For example, when faced with a choice between aiding a starving child and a starving dog, it is not merely permissible but morally obligatory to save the child first. Such prioritization differs from discrimination on the basis of gender or race, and it is not reducible to sentimental preference. Rather, it rests on distinctively human capacities—such as the ability to make autonomous choices, to demand and offer justification, to act on reasons (especially moral ones), and to bear moral responsibility.

Without these capacities there is no standpoint from which moral claims are made and answered, morality itself presupposes their exercise. These capacities are therefore morally relevant features. We value human interests more, not because of species membership as such, but because we value the capacities that make moral life possible—and freedom from severe suffering is the baseline condition for exercising them. Hence, the child’s hunger has greater moral urgency than the dog’s.

In response to Wei Benqun’s suggestion to analyze speciesism from a descriptive rather than evaluative angle, Horta elaborated on the distinction between anthropocentrism and speciesism. He contended that anthropocentrism is not inherently a form of speciesism—only anthropocentrism that is unjustified should be considered speciesism. On the question of whether sentience should be the sole criterion for evaluating speciesism, Horta asserted: “In a situation where animals of different species endure exactly the same level of suffering, then they should receive equal ethical consideration.”

During the Q&A session, one audience member asked: “Given that humans have caused many species to become endangered, do humans have the right to protect these species?” Horta acknowledged that humans should protect animals, though not because they belong to certain species, but because they are sentient individuals.

Another audience member argued that Horta’s proposed ethical benchmark of using sentience reflects anthropocentric thinking. Given that humans are fundamentally limited by their own cognitive constraints, we tend to imagine beings as more sentient when they are more similar to humans (such as by possessing a nervous system). Hence, the benchmark of sentience is not inclusive of the diverse range of species in the world beyond humans and animals.

Horta refuted this argument by explaining that sentience is indeed an objective criterion. The objectivity of a criterion lies in whether it considers the perspectives of all the affected, not in the identity of the proposer. In a thought experiment, Horta asks:, “Would we want to spend significant resources now to make it sure that, if we were to lose our capacity for sentience, we would continue living?” Most, if not all of us, would not want this, as in that scenario, life would lose its meaning, as we would be reduced to mere physical existence. Indeed, we could even say that in such a scenario we would disappear, only an empty body, not inhabited by us, would remain. Furthermore, sentience does not imply similarity to humans. There are sentient invertebrates that are different from us, and there is the possibility of AI in the future.. Therefore, even though the ones suggesting sentience as the criterion for ethical treatment are humans this does not constitute anthropocentric thinking.

Finally, one audience member pointed out that humans are incapable of reciprocating human respect. However, Horta argued that we should not lower our moral standards simply because other species cannot comprehend or respect them. Instead, we must act as reflection leads us to consider correct, which, he argues, should drives us to give full moral consideration to all who can be harmed. He also pointed out that there are human beings who cannot reciprocate either (for instance, babies), and yet we should give them full moral consideration.. Such commitment, he stressed, should not remain at a theoretical level but must translate into concrete action. Horta concluded by highlighting the work of Animal Ethics, a nonprofit organization he co-founded. He noted the increasing involvement of organizations in conducting meaningful research and rescuing wild animals affected by different causes, including natural disasters. Looking ahead, he expressed hope that society would think more critically about animal protection and work toward using human efforts to advance it—a vision he is grateful to see taking shape.

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Drafted by Lochlan Zhang and Hsu Shi En
Proofread by Oscar Horta

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[1] Oscar Horta, “Speciesism,” Oxford Public Philosophy, no. 4 (2024): 2, https://oxfordpublicphilosophy.com/sentience/sm.

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